What is Dasein?

[iambiguous]

And, given that there are not likely to be two situations that exactly overlap, we are not likely to get the same reactions when these folks are questioned about the trips.

Then it's exactly the same as people having different ideas about morality.

So it's not really about the dichotomy that you have proposed - is/ought.

And if people can agree that "fastest" is in fact the best in a particular context, then they can also agree that a specific moral criteria is the best in a particular context.

I'll either grasp this crucial point I think that you think you are making here or I won't.

The reason people think that flying is the fastest is that, in fact, it is the fastest. Regardless of the reason for the trip. If you want to get there the fastest you fly. At least until they invent, say, a "beam me up Scotty" technology in which you are disassembled in New york and then almost immediately reassembled in LA.

Whereras, while people might agree on a particular moral criteria if the purpose of the trip was to kill someone, what happens when others refuse to accept that criteria and propose a conflicting one instead? Either sanctioning the killing or not.

Why one and not the other, if only because some might agree you were justified in killing him and others might insist that you were not. Which "form of morality" can in fact be demonstrated to be "objectively best"?

Note to others:

Seriously, what important point is he making here that I keep missing? Objectively, flying is the fastest way to make the trip. And that's true for everyone. That's a fact. In this day and age anyway.

But if the purpose of the trip is to kill someone, how do we arrive at this same objective assessment when different people come to very different conclusions regarding whether this killing is morally justified?

[iambiguous]

Just try to imagine how comforted and consoled you would feel if you thought like me.

If there is oblivion after the grave, then there is nothing you can do about it.

If there is something after the grave, then there is nothing you can do about it.

If you think that you ought to do something before the grave, then do it.

If you can't think of anything to do, then don't do anything.

Sure, as a "general description" of the predicament that we are all in here, that is certainly one way to look at it.

Of course for some it will be considerably more effective than for others. Why? Because each of us as individuals is either more or less in the vicinity of the abyss, oblivion.

Existential death as it were.

On the other hand, there are those able to convince themselves that if they do behave in a particular manner on this side of the grave, they are rewarded with immortality and salvation on the other side of it.

And, in so believing, they are comforted and consoled.

And sure, while millions upon millions of them have simply been indoctrinated as children to embrace this soothing frame of mind, others have taken the time to explore God and religion in a considerably more sophisticated manner.

Introspectively, they come up with arguments able to sustain at least some measure of religious faith. Folks like you and Ierrellus.

All I can do then is to examine their narratives in places like this.

[iambiguous]

Just try to imagine how comforted and consoled you would feel if you thought like me.

This hole seems to differ in intensity depending on the context.

Exactly.

But just as crucially the manner in which one construes the meaning of that context as a particular individual out in a particular world.

I merely probe the extent to which the assessment is rooted in dasein more or less than in a probing philosophical examination.

[iambiguous]

If an optimal achievement is the best that can be done, and one scores a 1600 on a SAT test, hasn't one achieved the optimal score?

So here you are using 'optimal' in the sense of maximum. Like "what's the optimal amount of water that fits in a jug?".

I'm pretty sure that most of the time you don't use it in that sense.

In what sense then? As you think that I think the word "optimal" pertains to moral narratives out in a world bursting at the seams with hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of conflicting goods?

If you ask ... "what's the optimal way to achieve a maximum SAT score", then you're going to have some problems figuring it out.

Okay, but my point revolved more around the distinction between achieving the best/optimal SAT score [however you were able to figure it out] and coming up with the best/optimal argument pertaining to the use of affirmative action by colleges with regard to SAT scores.

[phyllo]

[iambiguous]

Again, that's just your "I" interpreting, reacting to and then judging my "I" in this exchange pertaining to these relationships.

No, that was me noting that you attributed motivations using one kind of not qualified type of language and that when you defend this behavior you describe in a new way. You call it suggesting, when it was stating. You say you suggested it might be, when you said it was. You rewrite history. To defend your 'I'. To fool me. To fool 'yourself'. I don't know.

You are a functioning objectivist and I was pointing this out.

Really, what on earth does this mean?

All I can do with folks like you is to note how obtuse, how abstract it is.

Then back to this:

Choose a set of conflicted behaviors out in a particular context that we are all likely to be familiar with. Which particular points will be made regarding which particular behaviors? What [in those points] can or cannot be demonstrated to be "good"?

Then we can discuss more descriptively, more substantively what it means to be a "functioning objectivist" in regards to our actual interactions with others. In particular, when they precipitate conflicts as a result of value judgments out of sync.

Perhaps the people you label objectivists 'really' or really deep down are not. Who knows?

That's basically my point. I describe the manner in which I construe the meaning of "objectivist" out in the world of conflicting human behaviors. But: How can this description be any less an existential contraption?

All others can do is to note the manner in which I stray from the official, technical understanding of the word by "serious philosophers".

Or, if they are willing to accept my understanding of it, note why they are not themselves an objectivist out in the is/ought world.

What we have to work with is words and actions. You decided to misrepresent what you said/did. I can't be sure of the motive, but it was slippery.

Please, let's bring this down out of the scholastic clouds and explore the words that we use in relationship to the world that we actually live in with others.

What words pertaining to what actions?

Instead, it's straight back up into the stratosphere of analyzing language itself:

And then given your own dasein based philosophy, how would 'you' know what 'you' really meant when you acted like an objectivist?

In a word: Huh?

[iambiguous]

Trust me, my friend...

You've recovered before, you'll recover again.

And, in the interim, you still retain that which I no longer have: the comfort and the consolation of whatever it is that I think that you are comforted and consoled regarding.

Though I'm still utterly at a loss in understanding exactly what that is. Either on this side or the other side of the grave.

[Karpel Tunnel]

All others can do is to note the manner in which I stray from the official, technical understanding of the word by "serious philosophers".

This and the whole scholastic accusation is not connected to my posts or criticisms of you. I have no problem at all with the type of discourse you use and this would be the wrong forum for me if I wanted scholastic posts - which I am not sure I am capable of myself and certainly haven't made any here. NOr does this fit Phyllo. It is loopy that you posit yourself as a victim of serious philosophers. Prismatic does take this kind of approach with you, but I sure haven't. This is just sloppy rude not really even noticing what people are saying.

And positioning yourself in some weird way, in a binary fashion, a victim of scholastic posters or Durant 'epistemologists'...philosophical bureaucrats. Rather than dealing with a range of different, primarily not 'serious philosophy' type criticisms.

'All others can do....' Well, no. If you cannot tell the difference between say Prismatic's criticism's of your position based on Heiddiger and definitions of specific terms
and my posts
dealing with criticisms of your behavior and positioning of yourself (of Phyllo's responses with his not scholastic approach to criticising you)

you are very confused, and conveniently one is left to guess.

And Once again you request concrete examples around how I deal with conflicting goods. I did this, weeks ago.

It is like communicating with a bot. Sometimes one not quite passing a Turing Test.

[iambiguous]

All others can do is to note the manner in which I stray from the official, technical understanding of the word by "serious philosophers".

This and the whole scholastic accusation is not connected to my posts or criticisms of you. I have no problem at all with the type of discourse you use and this would be the wrong forum for me if I wanted scholastic posts - which I am not sure I am capable of myself and certainly haven't made any here. NOr does this fit Phyllo. It is loopy that you posit yourself as a victim of serious philosophers. Prismatic does take this kind of approach with you, but I sure haven't. This is just sloppy rude not really even noticing what people are saying.

Note to others:

Are any of these "general descriptions" of me true? Well, let's take the components of our respective philosophies -- those variables that revolve around identity and value judgments -- and wrap them around a discussion that wraps around this:

Choose a set of conflicted behaviors out in a particular context that we are all likely to be familiar with. Which particular points will be made regarding which particular behaviors? What [in those points] can or cannot be demonstrated to be "good"?

However one might define the meaning of a scholastic discussion or a serious philosopher, my aim is to bring the words out into the world of actual conflicted goods. And to examine the extent to which "I" in such contexts is rooted more in either existential or intellectual contraptions

And positioning yourself in some weird way, in a binary fashion, a victim of scholastic posters or Durant 'epistemologists'...philosophical bureaucrats. Rather than dealing with a range of different, primarily not 'serious philosophy' type criticisms.

What on earth does this mean?!! And over and again both you and phyllo will ignore many of the points that I raise in my posts to you, focus in on just one point instead [as you do here], while ignoring altogether my requests that we do bring the discussion down to earth.

'All others can do....' Well, no. If you cannot tell the difference between say Prismatic's criticism's of your position based on Heiddiger and definitions of specific terms
and my posts
dealing with criticisms of your behavior and positioning of yourself (of Phyllo's responses with his not scholastic approach to criticising you)

you are very confused, and conveniently one is left to guess.

Yet again, I'm the issue here. It's not my attempts to yank these "differences" down out of the clouds -- to situate them in actual existential contexts. No, instead, it's my refusal to focus on the technical distinctions between the criticisms being leveled at me.

And Once again you request concrete examples around how I deal with conflicting goods. I did this, weeks ago.

Well, if you had, I must have missed it. Please try again. Though I suspect the problem here revolves around very different interpretations regarding what it means to attempt this.

My concrete examples are rooted existentially in my abortion trajectory above. The intertwining of experiences, relationships and ideas.

Let's examine what yours is embedded in.

[iambiguous]

I just Googled Heidegger Dasein Ethics

This review of Michael Lewis's book Heidegger and the Place of Ethics was near the top.

Consider:

That Heidegger's text displays a certain ambivalence toward being-with in relation to authenticity suggests that he does not yet have the right idea of being-with. To help him along, Lewis argues that there is a second form of being-with in conscience. Since conscience involves the call of being, Lewis maintains that conscience entails a relation between being and beings and so, a relation of being with beings -- in other words, a thought of being-with that is related to the ontological difference. Since conscience plays a role in Dasein's authenticity, this form of being-with is located squarely in the place of ethics, and so we find that authenticity does or could have something to do with being-with and the ontological difference. But the site of this differentiation remains Dasein, and thus occurs within the limits of Dasein's finitude.

Am I even allowed [in a philosophy forum] to ask, "what on earth does this mean?"

This sort of philosophical "analysis" can go on page after page after page after page; and not once is there any actual references to particular men and women "being with" others out in a specific context out in a specific world; such that an examination of particular behaviors in conflict allow us to discuss that which might be construed as either authentic or inauthentic behaviors.

What did Heidegger's own conscience tell him about authentic and inauthentic behaviors? And how is that related to the manner in which he construes the meaning of "being with" others as a manifestation of Dasein?

In my view, it is one thing to grapple technically with understanding Dasein as a component of Heidegger's "serious philosophy", but eventually we need to get around to understanding how a true understanding of that can be integrated into a discussion of how Heidegger intertwined Dasein as he understood it and the manner in which my own understanding of dasein here -- viewtopic.php?f=1&t=176529 -- allows us to shift the discussion to an examination of Heidegger's political narrative re fascism and the Nazis.

What here is to be construed as either authentic or inauthentic choices in "being with" others?

[iambiguous]

From...

"The Limits of Authenticity"
by Ben G. Yacobi in Philosophy Now magazine

The existential philosopher Martin Heidegger said that authenticity is choosing the nature of one’s existence and identity.

Ironically enough this all commenses with "I" being "thrown" historically and culturally [fortuitously at birth] into a demographic smorgasbord such that "I" has absolutely no choice whatsoever regarding the manner in which "reality" is contrued. And this is applicable with respect to both nature and nurture.

So much for "authenticity" here, right? For literally years "I" is shaped and molded by others to go in particular directions in order to accumulate [oftentimes conflicting] sets of rewards and to avoid [oftentimes conflicting] sets of punishments.

He also linked authenticity to an awareness of mortality, since only by keeping in mind one’s inevitable death can one lead a truly authentic life.

How then is a particular narrative to be construed as either authentic or inauthentic --- other than as an existential contraption? We all die. But the actual lives that we live propel/compel us in any number of different directions when reflecting on death.

So, you tell me: How does one die "authentically"?

Are those who believe in God "inauthentic" because they refuse to accept death as the literal obliteration of "I"?

Can a "noble" death be described such that "authentic" men and women are able to embrace and then embody it at the grave?

Can we capitilize Death as we do Dasein such that a philosopher -- or a Heidegger scholar -- is able to link the two?

Epistemologically?

And how is what any particular one of us think we know about death here and now in sync with how the death of "I" may or may not be within reach ontologically? Or, perhaps, even more enigmatically, teleologically?

His project of realizing one’s identity in the context of an external world with its influences, implies a complex relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity which means that they should be viewed not as mutually exclusive concepts, but as complementary and interdependent. Heidegger argued that both authenticity and inauthenticity are basic forms of being in the world, and they cannot be separated.

Of course my point revolves less around how complex this all is and more around the extent to which the complexity itself will always be embedded largely in an "existential contraption".

What, in my view, makes "authentic" and "inauthentic" both "complementary and interdependent" is grounded in the fact [historically, culturally, experientially] that "I" here is ever a constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed constellation of particular existential variables evolving from the cradle to the grave given a sequence of wholly unique experiences, relationships and access to knowledge and information.

On the other hand, really, just how "authentic" is this "assessment" itself?