surreptitious75 wrote:I do not think that induction is a very reliabe metric outside of science
Because political arguments tend to be ideological and tribal by nature
Were politics a more clinical discipline like science then induction may be more valid
But unlike science it is more about subjective interpretation than about anything else
Surreptitious,
Did You notice that after You commented I edited my writing previous to Yours? I tried to induce to You, the idea that political reasoning may be too broad a word, within which ito connect with what You said postscriptivelly. That You did not, and could have, kind of processess Your thinking into denying, a relevance
a priori.
Denying is proof, (whatever the reason of the method) of negating inductive logic. You were instead deducting into and from an exclusion of induction, and maintaining, that it is not appropriate to hold politics to the level of science. Your method claimed the invalidity of.political science along the very logic that was inappropriate to it.
Now I am not saying that your motive was relevant. here, but , that is not the goal with which You should or even need to connect with.
The idea of connecting intentions with goals is.precisely to transcend immediate concerns . It is meant o show relevance as to how to raise.above your view of the appropriateness of using scientific methodology to politics.
Yet , contrarily, you are using deductive logic to prove the illogic of induction to politics.
Do You see the contradiction inherent in political argumentation as proof of what is considered as as separate source of logical structure?
The patent and latent arguments covering dynamics of proof, of convincing others that the intentional goals are somehow different then the ones which gather certainty in a procedural developing. and changing contextual derivation?
That is what I am trying to gett at.
Here is a current conclusion by unambiguous on the current Wittgenstein forum, as it bears on this current topic:
"Part of the problem with many interpretations o' On Certainty'is that people fail to take (linguistic and prelinguistic beliefs) into account how both kinds of beliefs can be hinges. This will be explained in more detail later."
Do You see the congruence?