Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'differential

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Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'differential

Postby scherz0 » Sat Jul 31, 2021 1:16 am

English isn't my first language; I don't understand the difference between 'differential' and 'different' as adjectives. Why do these books use 'differential' as an adjective? Why not just write 'different'?

But if the NJT [Abbreviation for Joseph Raz's “Normal Justification Thesis”] fails therefore both for authority as accountability and, consequently, for authority as the capacity to create preemptive reasons, what then can justify
differential authority relations, as in legal and political authority? The lesson to draw
from the failure of the NJT, I believe, is that the only justification that can succeed is
one that proceeds from within the second-person standpoint, beginning with the
assumption that we all share a common basic authority to make claims and demands
of one another at all, and proceeding from there to consider what differential claims to
authority anyone could sensibly accept, or no one could reasonably reject on that basis.
The basic premise underlying any successful justification of differential authority, in
other words, is that we share a common basic authority to make claims of each other
just by virtue of being persons. Or, as Rawls put the point, to be a person is to be a
"self-originating source of valid claims" (Rawls 1980: 546).28


1. Stephen Darwall, Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I (2013), p 167.

To flesh out this idea further, recall Fried's characterization of contracts as that body of the law that governs the individual's right to dispose of his resources or entitlements to them as he sees fit. Contracts redistribute resources among the parties to them: apples for oranges, houses for money, etc. On the view Kronman takes issue with, contracts redistribute wealth or resources according to the desires of the parties, not according to any principle of distributive justice: the desires of the parties being expressed by the voluntariness of the promises they give. Kronman's point is that whether an agreement is voluntary is just the
question of whether it involves objectionable advantage-taking, and that is the question of the legitimacy of securing
wealth through differential patterns of capacities, skills, and resources.


2. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Philosophy Of Law: An Introduction To Jurisprudence (2018), Anyone know the page number?

One might respond that Hellman leaves open the possibility that there are other ways of offending against "the equal moral worth of persons" than through demeaning others (Hellman 2008: 31). Hence, she might agree that the former scenario clashes
with the principle of equal moral worth. She might even concede that it does so to a higher degree than the latter scenario. But if so, she cannot claim to identify wrongful discrimination on the basis of which kinds of differential treatment are demeaning (Hellman 2008: 29), because she would have conceded that differential treatment may
clash with the principle of equal moral worth, even if it is not demeaning.


3. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (2012), p 579.

On the other hand, the most recent representatives of the sociology of law—Pound, Cardozo, Commons, Llewellyn, and Arnold in the United States; Kantorowicz, Eugene Ehrlich and Hugo Sinzheimer in Germany; Duguit, Hauriou, Leroy, and Morin in France—were occupied mainly with sociological description of the actual state of law and the conflicts surging within its bosom between rigid law and spontaneous, living law. Their efforts have been concentrated above all (despite the wide divergence among their various conceptions) either on the description of modifications of juridical technique and the activity of tribunals with reference to major changes intervening in the social reality of law, or on a general description of the transformation of the actual system of law under various aspects, particularly under that of the growth of the jural framework of the economic society expressed in the growing role of the autonomous law of labor unions and trusts. Thus, except for some precious indications by Ehrlich, Pound, Hauriou, and Llewellyn—the distinction between systematic sociology of law and genetic legal sociology, as well as between differential jural typology of inclusive societies and that of particular groups, and moreover that between microsociology of law and the jural typology has not been clearly worked out. This has led frequently to a much too dogmatic tendency in analyses. Some legal sociologists have attributed to juridical techniques of a certain kind a too important role and have verged on identifying the technique of modern "sociological jurisprudence" or of its opponents, the "legal realists", with the fate of the sociology of law itself.


4. Norman K. Denzin, Sociology of Law (2020) Anyone know the page number?
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby Chakra Superstar » Sat Jul 31, 2021 4:55 am

Hi scherz0,
Differential is not just different; it requires you take into account all the considerations, circumstances and issues for each option.
"Justification for differential authority" for instance, requires you take into account everything that might come up about accepting that type of authority.
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby obsrvr524 » Sat Jul 31, 2021 2:41 pm

-
I think in legal, medical, mechanical, and maths terms "differential" refers to minute differences - often immeasurably small.
              You have been observed.
    Though often tempted to encourage a dog to distinguish color I refuse to argue with him about it
    It's just the same Satanism as always -
    • separate the bottom from the top,
    • the left from the right,
    • the light from the dark, and
    • blame each for the sins of the other
    • - until they beg you to take charge.
    • -- but "you" have been observed --

The prospect of death weighs naught upon the purpose of life - James S Saint - 2009
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby iambiguous » Sat Jul 31, 2021 4:31 pm

And then there's this thing: https://iep.utm.edu/diff-ont/

It shows us just how impenetrable it can seem for some in trying to understand something like this "technically".

Me, I'll no doubt never master it "up there" myself.

Instead, all I can do is to ask those who think that they do have a handle on it to take their conclusions out into the world that we live in and, given a set of circumstances in which value judgments come into conflict, make specific references to it there.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

Start here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 1&t=176529
Then here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 5&t=185296
And here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 1&t=194382

"Sure, it works in practice, but does it work in theory?"

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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby obsrvr524 » Sat Jul 31, 2021 7:33 pm

-
"The circumstantial details that demand a significant difference."
              You have been observed.
    Though often tempted to encourage a dog to distinguish color I refuse to argue with him about it
    It's just the same Satanism as always -
    • separate the bottom from the top,
    • the left from the right,
    • the light from the dark, and
    • blame each for the sins of the other
    • - until they beg you to take charge.
    • -- but "you" have been observed --

The prospect of death weighs naught upon the purpose of life - James S Saint - 2009
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby iambiguous » Sat Jul 31, 2021 7:48 pm

obsrvr524 wrote:-
"The circumstantial details that demand a significant difference."


We'll need a context of course.

This and a convincing argument that, given James S. Saint's assessment of determinism, our own assessment of "differential" is or is not but the psychological illusion of free will given further that our brains wholly in sync with the laws of matter are such that any conclusions we make in regard to "differential" [legal or otherwise] we either were or were not able to opt of our own volition for another conclusion instead.
He was like a man who wanted to change all; and could not; so burned with his impotence; and had only me, an infinitely small microcosm to convert or detest. John Fowles

Start here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 1&t=176529
Then here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 5&t=185296
And here: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopi ... 1&t=194382

"Sure, it works in practice, but does it work in theory?"

Danny Embling: "People wonder how Hitler managed to get so many followers...it's never surprised me."
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby Chakra Superstar » Sat Jul 31, 2021 9:04 pm

obsrvr524 wrote:-
I think in legal, medical, mechanical, and maths terms "differential" refers to minute differences - often immeasurably small.


True. I should have said 'minute' differences but still these changes must be taken into consideration otherwise they could have just written 'small' or 'minutely' different.


PS: obsrvr are you Australian as PK claims? I thought you were British. If so, what state do you live in; just curious about your political surroundings.
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby fuse » Sun Aug 01, 2021 11:23 am

scherz0 wrote:Why do these books use 'differential' as an adjective? Why not just write 'different'?

As an adjective, differential is like the meta version of different. It means something along the lines of: able to differ, differing, or varying. Rather than implying difference from some particular example that might have already been mentioned.

Try the following translations to see if they make sense in context.

Darwall wrote:..what then can justify differential authority relations..?

What can justify that authority relations should differ at all, in the first place?

If he had written 'different' one might have asked "different from what?" But his point isn't about justifying specific types of authority, it's about justifying how authority should vary or be able to vary in the first place. Something like that.

Routledge Companion wrote:..differential treatment may clash with the principle..

Varying treatment may clash with the principle..

("different treatment" could be mistaken to mean "different than some treatment x" or "abnormal treatment")
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby Parodites » Mon Aug 09, 2021 12:13 pm

Differential is the basis for forming, thinking about, or categorizing differences. Different is just different: opposed to.

So differential diagnostics, in medicine, is when you try to find reasons to develop alternative diagnoses for a disease. Not just to think of different diagnoses at a whim. So maybe, in differential diagnostics, I see that a guy was diagnosed with flesh eating bacteria, but then I learn that he was possibly bitten by a snake. His being bit by a snake is the differential criteria to develop the alternative theory that his necrotic tissue is because of snake venom. Get it? So apply that same thing to legal questions instead of medicine.
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Re: Why do these Legal Philosophy textbooks write 'different

Postby Yazata » Sun Sep 05, 2021 6:44 pm

I can only tell you what I take it to mean.

'Differential claims' seems to indicate a particular kind of claim that subdivides into different strengths of claim. Where there's one kind of claim, or one basic theory of claims, it's recognzing that some claims might be stronger than others within that account.

Contrast that with 'different claims', which suggests different kinds of claims or different theories of claims, or claims justified in different ways.
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